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Apple warning about spyware targeting of journalist Radwan Mortada calls for urgent protection and an independent investigation

Lebanese journalist Radwan Mortada’s announcement that he received a new notification from Apple about being targeted with mercenary spyware calls for urgent protective measures and an independent investigation. The screenshot of the notification accompanying his account indicates that another attack on his device was detected, following an earlier notification on 23 November 2021, and that the new round of notifications covered targeted users in 99 countries. [1] These details constitute an indication that must be taken seriously, but do not, on their own, establish that spyware was successfully installed on the phone.

The National Human Rights Commission, including the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, calls for a response centred on the journalist’s safety, the protection of his confidential sources, and the preservation of digital evidence. The published and verified technical examination findings reviewed in preparing this briefing do not identify the software used, its operator, or the party that commissioned it in Mortada’s latest case. His journalistic work on the 2024 pager explosions in Lebanon constitutes relevant context.

1. Scope of the briefing and limitations of the evidence

This briefing is based on an interview with journalist Radwan Mortada[2] and a screenshot of the Apple notification addressed to him, dated 29 October 2026, held by the National Human Rights Commission, including the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, as well as a link to his post on X as an additional reference for his public testimony.[3] Press coverage of the current round of notifications was published on 30 October 2026. [4]

The briefing provides a preliminary human rights assessment, rather than a digital forensic examination. No technical inspection of Mortada’s device was conducted in preparing it; it therefore does not reach a definitive conclusion on whether it was successfully compromised, the type of spyware used, or the identity of the party responsible for the targeting. Information concerning his experience and the circumstances in which he received the notification is attributed to his account in the interview, while general technical findings are based on specialised publications with identified sources.

2. What does the notification establish?

The new message from Apple states that this new notification is separate from the 2021 notification and concerns another attack that was detected. The reference to “99 countries” describes the geographical scope of this round of notifications; it does not mean that there are 99 attacking governments, nor does it specify the number of victims or confirmed compromises. The reference to more than 150 countries concerns the cumulative total of countries in which users have been sent notifications since 2021.

Apple explains that its notifications are based on high-confidence assessments, while acknowledging that absolute certainty is unattainable and withholding detection details that could help attackers evade discovery. [5] Amnesty International’s Security Lab likewise distinguishes between an attempted compromise and a successful infection; a subsequent digital forensic examination is needed to establish that spyware was installed. [6] Accordingly, the notification justifies immediate assistance, but does not permit conclusions about every stage of the attack.

The investigation should determine whether earlier security incidents have been documented. The notification date must be recorded separately from the dates of any potential technical exploitation, as the warning may concern activity detected retrospectively. Technical findings should explain their confidence level and the gaps that prevent more conclusive findings.

The notification does not identify Pegasus, NSO Group, any other supplier, or any particular state. References to known software, by way of example, must not turn into an attribution of responsibility. Nor does the recurrence of notifications establish uninterrupted surveillance between 2021 and 2026, the use of the same software, or the involvement of the same operator.

3. Mortada’s testimony and the Lebanese context

In an interview conducted by the International Humanitarian Law Committee of the National Human Rights Commission on 1 November 2026,[7] journalist Radwan Mortada stated that he had received the notification from Apple, explaining that he did not know whether the targeting was related to his film about the 2024 pager explosions in Lebanon. [8] Independent historical evidence supports his account of having received an earlier notification: on 26 January 2022, Human Rights Watch reported that he had posted information on Twitter on 24 and 26 November 2021 about an Apple notification concerning the possible targeting of his phone by state-sponsored attackers. This source documents his announcement of the notification at the time, without, on its own, establishing that his device was successfully compromised. [9]

According to Mortada’s account, the first notification he received about being targeted with spyware dates back to 2017, making the latest notification the third of its kind. He explained that on each of the two previous occasions he permanently disposed of the targeted device, rather than having it technically examined to verify whether a compromise had occurred and address it if confirmed. He added that organisations specialising in tracking and detecting spyware had contacted him and provided digital protection guidance, and that he had enabled Lockdown Mode on his current device as a precautionary measure to strengthen protection while deciding on the next steps concerning it. [10]

Lebanon also has a documented precedent involving a human rights researcher. Human Rights Watch reported that its Beirut office director, Lama Fakih, was targeted with Pegasus five times between April and August 2021. The findings of the organisation’s digital forensic examination were independently reviewed and confirmed by Amnesty International’s Security Lab. [11]

Among the most concerning aspects of the warning’s wording is Apple’s indication that the attack is likely to target the recipient specifically “because of who you are or what you do” (because of who you are or what you do). The word “likely” preserves the warning’s precision here: it indicates directed targeting, but does not establish the specific motive or the identity of the responsible party. In the case of an investigative journalist, this raises concerns extending beyond his personal privacy to the confidentiality of his communications and sources, the safety of witnesses and collaborators, and unpublished journalistic material. A phone compromise, if confirmed, could expose the identities of people who communicated with him in confidence, or expose them to pressure and reprisals, potentially affecting his ability to continue his investigations and the willingness of other sources to contact him. These risks call for urgent protection and an independent technical examination, while treating any possible connection between the targeting and the film “The Trap” as a hypothesis requiring evidence; the notification alone establishes neither that connection nor the successful installation of spyware on the phone. [12]

4. The professional and security context surrounding the targeting of the journalist

The assessment of the risks facing journalist Radwan Mortada cannot be separated from the nature of his investigative work and the recent attacks on his family home. He participated in preparing the investigative documentary “The Trap”, released in two parts on Al Jazeera 360 in September 2026, which examined the 2024 pager explosions in Lebanon, tracing the devices’ supply chain, the network of companies and intermediaries, and the suspicions preceding the explosions. [13] The nature of this work raises serious concerns about the potential exposure of his journalistic sources, witnesses, and confidential correspondence to danger if his phone is confirmed to have been compromised. These are potential risks, rather than outcomes established in his case.

On 17 October 2026, Israeli forces blew up Mortada’s family home in the town of Aita al-Jabal in southern Lebanon. [14] In a subsequent interview, Mortada stated that Israeli soldiers had entered the house and stolen items from it before blowing it up, stressing that it was outside the area under Israeli occupation and far from combat locations and military installations; these details remain attributed to his account. [15] According to a report published by The Grayzone, in a post dated 21 October 2026, the Committee to Protect Journalists condemned the destruction of the house and expressed concern that it was connected to Mortada’s journalistic work, noting that he had released a documentary about the pager explosions weeks earlier. [16]

The sources reviewed do not establish a connection between the destruction of the house and the latest digital targeting. Nevertheless, the proximity of these events in time, alongside the repeated security notifications he received, requires a comprehensive assessment of the risks threatening his personal and digital safety and the safety of his family and sources. It also calls for an independent investigation into each incident, examining any potential links between them without prejudging the findings or attributing responsibility without evidence.

5. Lessons from similar investigations

Amnesty International’s Security Lab has repeatedly demonstrated the need to follow preliminary warnings with meticulous technical work. Its guidance issued in April 2024 explains that examining the devices of people who received notifications has, in many cases, established targeting and compromise, including through Pegasus. [17]

In March 2025, the lab documented the targeting of two journalists from the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network in Serbia with Pegasus. One of the journalists, identified by a pseudonym, did not open the malicious link, and researchers found no indication that the software had been successfully installed on her phone. [18] This case illustrates why a documented attempted attack should not automatically be described as a completed compromise.

Different software may produce similar initial warnings. In June 2025, Citizen Lab published digital forensic evidence linking attacks targeting two journalists to Paragon’s Graphite spyware, after they received notifications from Apple. It confirmed the compromise of an unnamed European journalist’s device and the targeting of Italian journalist Ciro Pellegrino. [19] The distinction between these two findings is essential. Investigators should test competing technical explanations instead of assuming that all mercenary spyware notifications refer to Pegasus.

5. Human rights at risk

 

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects privacy and correspondence under Article 17, freedom of expression under Article 19, and the right to an effective remedy under Article 2(3). [20] Unlawful surveillance of a journalist may affect all these rights together, as it can expose confidential sources, unpublished investigations, and personal information about people who did not consent to its disclosure.

The risks are not confined to the person whose phone is targeted. A source may refrain from communicating for fear of being identified, a witness may decline to provide evidence, or colleagues may self-censor their reporting. These are foreseeable risks, rather than outcomes established in Mortada’s case. Protection must be provided regardless of the journalist’s political views, employer, or the popularity of his reporting.

States must ensure that surveillance complies with the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality, and subject it to effective independent oversight. Invoking national security does not dispense with these requirements. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has called for a moratorium on the use of hacking tools until adequate safeguards are in place.[21] Any investigation must also protect the journalist’s sources; assistance must not become a gateway to unrestricted access to his journalistic material.

6. Immediate protection and preservation of evidence

Mortada should have access to independent experts through a secure channel and with his informed consent. Apple recommends verifying notifications by signing in directly to its account website and seeking specialised assistance, including from Access Now’s Digital Security Helpline. [22] Amnesty International’s Security Lab also receives requests for digital forensic support from at-risk journalists and other members of civil society. [23]

Protection and evidence preservation should be planned together. Experts should advise on securing communications and documenting the device’s condition before taking steps that could destroy evidence, including a factory reset. Original notification messages and relevant metadata must be retained, the handling and transfer of materials documented, and access to them restricted.

The journalist and experts should agree on how to communicate with potentially affected sources without unnecessarily exposing their identities or publishing unverified claims about a compromise. Sensitive conversations may need to be moved to another independently secured device pending completion of the assessment. These decisions must be based on an individual risk assessment that includes the safety of people about whom the phone may contain information.

Any examination must specify what information will be extracted, who may access it, how long it will be retained, and how journalistic material unrelated to the investigation will be protected. The limitations of any negative examination finding should also be clarified, and it should not automatically be presented as proof that no targeting occurred.

7. Recommendations

The National Human Rights Commission, including the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, calls on the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation to promptly assess the information concerning the reported digital targeting of journalist Radwan Mortada and open an independent, impartial, and effective investigation where the legal grounds for doing so are met. The investigation should draw on specialised and independent technical expertise, ensure the collection and preservation of evidence in accordance with the law, verify the nature of the targeting and the extent of its success, and determine the resulting responsibilities. The Commission also calls for the public to be informed of such findings and progress of the investigation as may be disclosed, while respecting its confidentiality, protecting journalistic sources and privacy, and safeguarding the integrity of proceedings.

The Commission calls on the competent Lebanese authorities to conduct an independent and effective investigation into the destruction of Mortada’s home by Israeli forces, document the circumstances of the attack, determine the resulting legal responsibilities, and examine whether it may be connected to his journalistic work. It also calls for a comprehensive assessment of the security and digital risks he faces, and examination of any potential connections between the attack on his home and the repeated notifications about spyware targeting, without assuming such connections in advance, while ensuring the protection of his sources, the confidentiality of his journalistic material, and the privacy of his family members.

The Commission urges the competent authorities to establish a confidential and voluntary referral mechanism enabling journalists and human rights defenders who receive spyware notifications to obtain independent technical and legal assistance. Access to protection must not be conditional on handing over devices or data unrelated to the incident, or disclosing source identities or unpublished journalistic material.

It also calls on Parliament and the government, each within its powers, to strengthen oversight of the procurement, transfer, and use of surveillance technologies, establish effective safeguards for transparency and accountability, and provide effective remedies for victims of unlawful surveillance. Spyware that cannot be used in a manner consistent with human rights should be banned, and the transfer and use of surveillance technologies suspended where adequate safeguards to prevent abuses are absent, in line with the concerns and recommendations of United Nations human rights mechanisms. [24]

The Commission stresses the need to provide a confidential channel for receiving relevant information and to monitor the authorities’ response within its legal mandate. Its public briefings should distinguish between accounts, documentary evidence, and technical findings, explain any corrections, and allow the parties concerned to respond to evidence-based allegations. Informed consent must also be obtained before publishing personal information or non-public testimony, and technical or personal details that could expose affected people or sources to additional risks must not be disclosed.

The Commission calls on technology companies to continue issuing timely notifications and security updates and to support independent research. It also calls on surveillance software suppliers and their investors to fulfil their responsibility to respect human rights and to prevent and address harms associated with their activities. It urges media organisations to fund digital protection and confidential incident response, including for freelance journalists on an equal basis, and to ensure that examinations are completed when the initial assessment leaves substantial technical questions unresolved. The urgent priority remains practical protection for Mortada, his family, his sources, and all others communicating with him, alongside a credible investigation that establishes the facts and ensures accountability.


Footnotes

[1] Apple, notification concerning the detection of a targeted mercenary spyware attack against journalist Radwan Mortada’s iPhone, 29 October 2026; a screenshot of the notification is held by the National Human Rights Commission. The notification indicates the detection of a new attack, separate from the earlier notification sent on 23 November 2021.

[2] Interview No. /2026/1101/01 with journalist Radwan Mortada, International Humanitarian Law Committee of the National Human Rights Commission, including the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, 1 November 2026.

[3] Radwan Mortada, post on X containing an image of Apple’s notification concerning the targeting of his phone with mercenary spyware, available at: https://x.com/radwanmortada/status/2116163605796200693/photo/1.

[4] Tim Starks, CyberScoop, ‘Apple alerts warn victims in 99 countries about mercenary spyware infections’ [in English], 30 October 2026, https://cyberscoop.com/apple-spyware-notifications-pall-mall-process

[5] Apple, ‘About Apple threat notifications and protecting against mercenary spyware’ [in English], 13 August 2026, https://support.apple.com/en-us/102174 (accessed: 1 November 2026).

[6] Amnesty International Security Lab, ‘Apple threat notifications: What they mean and what you can do’ [in English], 11 April 2024, https://securitylab.amnesty.org/latest/2024/04/apple-threat-notifications-what-they-mean-and-what-you-can-do

[7] Interview No. /2026/1101/01 with journalist Radwan Mortada, International Humanitarian Law Committee of the National Human Rights Commission, including the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, 1 November 2026.

[8] Al Jazeera 360, ‘The Trap’, an investigative documentary examining the 2024 pager explosions in Lebanon; available at: https://www.aljazeera360.com/video/1017661.

[9] Human Rights Watch, ‘Human Rights Watch Among Pegasus Spyware Targets’, 26 January 2022, particularly the reference to Radwan Mortada’s posts dated 24 and 26 November 2021; available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/26/human-rights-watch-among-pegasus-spyware-targets

[10] Apple, ‘Protect your devices with Lockdown Mode’, Personal Safety User Guide, October 2025. The company explains that Lockdown Mode is a heightened protection option for people exposed to highly sophisticated cyberattacks, including attacks using mercenary spyware. It reduces opportunities for attack by restricting certain app, website, and communication functions, including blocking most types of message attachments, disabling link previews and certain web technologies, and restricting some incoming invitations and communications. Its benefit lies in strengthening protection and reducing avenues for targeting; enabling it does not, in itself, constitute evidence of a compromise or a substitute for a specialised technical examination. Available at: https://support.apple.com/ar-qa/guide/personal-safety/ipsd5baf79d0/web

[11] Human Rights Watch, ‘Human Rights Watch Among Pegasus Spyware Targets’, 26 January 2022; documents the targeting of Lama Fakih, then director of the organisation’s Beirut office, five times between April and August 2021, and notes that Amnesty International’s Security Lab reviewed the organisation’s digital forensic analysis and confirmed its findings; available at: https://www.hrw.org/ar/news/2022/01/26/381008

[12] Amnesty International Security Lab, ‘Apple threat notifications: What they mean and what you can do’, 11 April 2024; includes the warning’s wording indicating possible targeting because of a person’s identity or the nature of their work, and explains that receiving a notification does not necessarily mean a successful compromise; available at: https://securitylab.amnesty.org/latest/2024/04/apple-threat-notifications-what-they-mean-and-what-you-can-do/

[13] Al Jazeera Net, ‘An engineer who confounded Israel: a documentary reveals the hidden details of the Hezbollah pager massacre’, 17 September 2026; available at:https://www.aljazeera.net/video/al-jazeeraspecialprograms/2026/9/17/مهندس-أربك-إسرائيل-وثائقي-يكشف-خفايا ; and Nizar Nimer, ‘The Trap: How the resistance almost thwarted the pager explosions’, Al-Akhbar, 7 October 2026; available at:https://www.al-akhbar.com/NewspaperArticles/culture/906396/المصيدة-كيف-كادت-المقاومة-أن-تحبط-تفجيرات-البيجر

[14] L’Orient-Le Jour, ‘Israeli army blows up the house of journalist Radwan Mortada in Aita el-Jabal and continues attacks in southern Lebanon’ [in English], 17 October 2026, citing the newspaper’s correspondent in southern Lebanon; available at:

https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1551154/israeli-army-blows-up-the-house-of-journalist-radwan-mortada-in-aita-el-jabal-and-continues-attacks-in-southern-lebanon.html

[15] Wyatt Reed, ‘Israel demolishes home of Lebanese journalist whose viral film exposed pager attack’ [in English], The Grayzone, 23 October 2026. The report includes an interview with Mortada in which he recounts soldiers entering the house, looting its contents, and blowing it up, and explains the house’s location in relation to areas of occupation and fighting; available at:

https://thegrayzone.com/2026/10/23/israel-demolish-journalist-home/amp

[16] Committee to Protect Journalists, Middle East and North Africa programme account, post on X, 21 October 2026, as cited in Wyatt Reed’s report referenced in the preceding footnote, which quotes the statement and links to the original post. Direct access to the post was not possible during verification; post link:

https://x.com/CPJMENA/status/2112858786876498381

[17] Amnesty International Security Lab, ‘Serbia: Journalists targeted with Pegasus spyware’ [in English], 27 March 2025, https://securitylab.amnesty.org/latest/2025/03/journalists-targeted-with-pegasus-spyware . The research includes NSO Group’s response that it cannot comment on specific customers, and its affirmation of its commitment to respecting human rights.

[18] Amnesty International Security Lab, ‘Serbia: Journalists targeted with Pegasus spyware’ [in English], 27 March 2025. The report documents the targeting of two female journalists from the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network in February 2025, and explains that the journalist referred to by the pseudonym ‘Bogdana’ did not click the malicious link, and that digital forensic examination of her phone showed no indication that Pegasus had been successfully installed; available at: https://securitylab.amnesty.org/latest/2025/03/journalists-targeted-with-pegasus-spyware

[19] Citizen Lab, ‘Graphite Caught: First Forensic Confirmation of Paragon’s iOS Mercenary Spyware Finds Journalists Targeted’ [in English], 12 June 2025. The report presents digital forensic evidence confirming, with a high degree of confidence, the targeting of Italian journalist Ciro Pellegrino and a European journalist who requested anonymity with Graphite, after they received two notifications from Apple on 29 April 2025, and confirms that the European journalist’s device was compromised during January and early February 2025; available at: https://citizenlab.ca/research/first-forensic-confirmation-of-paragons-ios-mercenary-spyware-finds-journalists-targeted

[20]International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 2(3) (the right to an effective remedy), 17 (protection of privacy and correspondence), and 19 (freedom of opinion and expression); available at: https://2covenants.ohchr.org/About-ICCPR.html

[21] United Nations Office at Geneva, ‘Bi-weekly press briefing’ [in English], 16 September 2022, ‘Privacy in the digital age’ section, presentation of the findings and recommendations of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, https://www.unognewsroom.org/story/en/1287/bi-weekly-press-briefing-16-september-2022 .

[22] Apple, ‘About Apple threat notifications and protecting against mercenary spyware’ [in English], 13 August 2026, https://support.apple.com/en-us/102174 (accessed: 1 November 2026).

[23] Amnesty International Security Lab, ‘Apple threat notifications: What they mean and what you can do’ [in English], 11 April 2024, previously cited.

[24] United Nations Office at Geneva, ‘Bi-weekly press briefing’ [in English], 16 September 2022, ‘Privacy in the digital age’ section, presentation of the findings and recommendations of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, https://www.unognewsroom.org/story/en/1287/bi-weekly-press-briefing-16-september-2022 .

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NHRCLB
NHRCLBhttps://nhrclb.org
مؤسسة وطنية مستقلة منشأة بموجب القانون 62/ 2016، تتضمن آلية وقائية وطنية للتعذيب (لجنة الوقاية من التعذيب) عملاً بأحكام القانون رقم 12/ 2008 (المصادقة على البروتوكول الاختياري لاتفاقية مناهضة التعذيب). An independent national institution established under Law No. 62/2016, which includes a National Preventive Mechanism against torture (the Committee for the Prevention of Torture), in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 12/2008 (ratifying the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture). Une institution nationale indépendante établie en vertu de la loi n° 62/2016, qui comprend un mécanisme national de prévention de la torture (le Comité pour la prévention de la torture), conformément aux dispositions de la loi n° 12/2008 (ratifiant le Protocole facultatif se rapportant à la Convention contre la torture).