Pursuant to Law No. 62/2016 establishing the National Human Rights Commission, including the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, particularly the provisions empowering the Commission to provide opinions on draft laws, legislative proposals, and public policies related to human rights, and in accordance with its national mandate to promote and protect human rights under the Paris Principles, the National Human Rights Commission hereby presents its opinion on the proposed law entitled “Protection of Minors from the Use of Social Media Networks” and the proposed law aimed at “Banning the Use of Social Media by Minors”.
This opinion examines the provisions of both proposals in light of the Lebanese Constitution and international human rights standards and proposes a graduated, risk-based framework grounded in platform accountability, legal safeguards, and independent oversight.
I. Executive Summary and General Position
The National Human Rights Commission, including the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, welcomes Parliament’s attention to protecting children in the digital environment. The Commission has examined the two legislative proposals submitted in this regard. The first is the proposed law entitled “Protection of Minors from the Use of Social Media Networks,” registered on 15 December 2025 and signed by Members of Parliament Jamil Al Sayyed, Jihad Al Samad, Qassem Hashem, Mohammad Khawaja, Michel Daher, and Bilal Al Hashimi, which was referred to the Government on 17 December 2025. The second is the proposed law aimed at “Banning the Use of Social Media by Minors,” submitted by Member of Parliament Tony Frangieh on 25 February 2026.
The Commission considers that the risks addressed by the two proposals are genuine and require urgent legislative intervention. The addictive design of certain platforms, profiling and targeted advertising, bullying, harassment, grooming and sexual exploitation, and exposure to harmful or misleading content all affect children’s rights to health, safety, dignity, balanced development, and privacy.
However, the legitimacy of the objective is not, in itself, sufficient to establish the legitimacy of the means employed. Having examined the provisions of both proposals in light of the Lebanese Constitution and Lebanon’s international obligations—particularly the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—and drawing on Decision No. 2026-911 DC of the French Constitutional Council, issued on 14 August 2026, the Commission considers that both proposals, albeit to varying degrees and in different forms, impose broad restrictions that do not adequately satisfy the requirements of necessity, proportionality, and legal clarity. Neither proposal establishes sufficiently detailed legislative safeguards for age verification, an independent oversight mechanism, or effective avenues for redress.
Accordingly, the Commission recommends that neither proposal be enacted in its current form. This opinion provides an independent assessment of each proposal in light of its particular structure and provisions. The common human rights principle that should guide any redrafting is a shift away from a blanket prohibition based solely on age towards a graduated framework based on risks and functionalities. Such a framework should impose a duty of care on platforms from the design stage, protect privacy, ensure parental guidance consistent with the child’s evolving capacities, and provide for independent oversight. The regulatory framework should also address corporate accountability, algorithmic transparency, surveillance-based advertising, and the digital literacy and empowerment of children and their families, rather than reducing protection to merely preventing minors from holding accounts.
II. Content and Purpose of the Two Proposals
1. Proposal Submitted by a Group of Members of Parliament on 15 December 2025
The first proposal consists of six articles. Article 1 prohibits minors under the age of sixteen from using social media networks unless their parents or guardians permit them to do so “under their supervision and for a specified period.” Article 2 prohibits minors of the same age from accessing video-sharing services.
Article 3 requires the platforms X, TikTok, YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram to take steps to prevent persons under the age of sixteen from using their services and to verify users’ ages by requiring the presentation of personal identification documents—namely an identity card or an equivalent document disclosing personal details. Article 4 provides for fines of up to USD 50 million for non-compliance, in accordance with the legal procedures permitted under Lebanese law and relevant international law. Article 5 delegates the detailed implementation measures to decrees adopted by the Council of Ministers upon the joint proposal of the Ministers of Telecommunications, Education, and Finance. The law would enter into force immediately upon its publication.
2. Proposal Submitted by Member of Parliament Tony Frangieh on 25 February 2026
The second proposal aims to protect children and minors from the psychological, social, and digital risks resulting from the uncontrolled use of social media platforms. It defines a minor as any person under the age of fourteen and broadly defines social media platforms as any program, application, or electronic service that enables users to create a personal account, publish content, communicate, or build an audience. It prohibits the creation or activation of an account for any minor under the age of fourteen and requires platforms to adopt effective and reasonable age-verification measures.
The proposed obligations include age-verification mechanisms intended to preserve privacy, including the use of parental data, digital proof of age, or artificial intelligence-based tools; closing any account confirmed to belong to a minor below the prescribed age; and providing a child-safe version where a platform wishes to serve younger users, subject to parental supervision. Article 5 also prohibits the collection of minors’ data for commercial or media-related purposes, the exploitation of their online activity, and the sale of their data.
The proposal subjects owners of non-compliant platforms to imprisonment for a term ranging from three months to two years and a fine ranging from five to ten times the official minimum wage. In cases of repeated non-compliance, it authorizes the Ministry of Telecommunications to suspend the platform partially or entirely until compliance is achieved. It exempts online education platforms and school-based and scientific communication applications, grants service providers three months to comply, and entrusts the Ministries of Telecommunications and Social Affairs with implementing the law.
Although the two proposals differ in terms of age thresholds, scope, exemptions, and penalties, protecting children from violence, exploitation, harmful content, and the physical and psychological effects of harmful digital design is a legitimate constitutional and human rights objective—and indeed an obligation of the State. Regulation, however, should not be based on viewing children solely as objects of protection. Children are also rights-holders and enjoy the rights to freedom of expression, access to information, freedom of association, and participation in cultural and educational life, in a manner consistent with their age and maturity. Protection, empowerment, and participation must therefore complement one another, rather than allowing one to negate the others.
III. The Commission’s Methodology for Assessing the Two Proposals
The Commission’s assessment does not proceed from a predetermined position either supporting or rejecting a ban. Rather, it is guided by the State’s dual obligation: to protect children from foreseeable harm and to respect their rights and freedoms while enabling them to benefit from the digital environment. The Commission therefore assessed each proposal independently against five interrelated tests.
The first test concerns legality and clarity: Does the text precisely identify the persons, services, and functionalities covered; the entities subject to obligations; the nature of those obligations; the applicable penalties; the relevant procedures; and the available avenues of appeal? Legislation that restricts a right or imposes a penalty must not rely on vague language that prevents those subject to it from reasonably anticipating what is prohibited or allows the authorities to expand restrictions without adequate safeguards.
The second test concerns the legitimacy of the objective and the suitability of the means: Is the measure genuinely connected to an established risk to children? Is there a demonstrable relationship between prohibiting an account or service and reducing bullying, exploitation, or psychological harm? Not all forms of social interaction are alike, and risks may simply shift from a prohibited platform to a game, messaging application, or smaller service not covered by the legislation.
The third test concerns necessity and the least restrictive means: If an equivalent level of protection can be achieved through privacy-by-default settings, blocking messages from strangers, restricting advertising and recommendations, or carefully designed parental consent, a general prohibition cannot be considered necessary. Before depriving an entire age group of access to a communication service, the legislature must examine the available alternatives and explain why they are insufficient.
The fourth test concerns proportionality in the strict sense: Even where a measure is useful and necessary, its cost in terms of expression, information, education, privacy, and equality must not outweigh its expected protective benefits. This requires consideration of children who use platforms to obtain psychological support or health information, communicate with family members in situations of migration and displacement, pursue education and creative activities, or participate in civic life.
The fifth test concerns safeguards and accountability: Who monitors the platforms? How is compliance measured? How can a child challenge an erroneous age classification? Who prevents age-verification data from being used for advertising or surveillance? Are fines and blocking orders subject to review by an independent court? In the absence of safeguards, the protective measure itself may become a source of privacy violations, discrimination, and exclusion.
The Commission emphasizes that its assessment does not compare the ages of fourteen and sixteen in the abstract. An age threshold becomes proportionate only when it is linked to the type of functionality, the level of risk, the available evidence, and the child’s evolving capacities. Parental consent does not automatically remedy every prohibition, nor is a general reference to privacy sufficient to guarantee its protection. This methodology informs both the Commission’s common observations and its separate assessment of each proposal.
IV. Human Rights Context and Structural Drivers of Digital Harm
A complete assessment of the two proposals cannot be limited to age thresholds, accounts, and verification mechanisms. It must also consider the economic and technological environment in which risks arise. Civil society organizations, digital-rights advocates, and child-protection experts have emphasized that children cannot be adequately protected merely by excluding them from platforms while the incentives that generate harmful content, data collection, and compulsive use remain embedded in the design and business models of those services.
These observations do not reject regulation or minimize the risks children face. Rather, they call for regulation that addresses root causes, is enforceable, and complies with human rights. A blanket prohibition may appear to offer a direct solution, but it could push children towards less-regulated spaces, encourage circumvention through alternative accounts and shared devices, or deprive compliant children of beneficial services, while leaving the platforms’ harmful practices unchanged for other users.
1. Human Rights Organizations’ Concerns About Blanket Restrictions
The adoption or consideration of age-based restrictions in several countries has prompted debate about their effectiveness and unintended consequences. Children and adolescents may provide an incorrect date of birth, use an adult’s account, or move to smaller applications that are not subject to the same level of oversight. This may reduce the ability of families, schools, and regulatory authorities to identify and respond to risks.
A prohibition that treats all services alike also disregards the differences between a public network driven by recommendations and advertising, a family messaging application, a support forum, and an educational or informational service. It may close channels that children use to build relationships, express their views, access news and educational opportunities, and participate in community initiatives—particularly where no alternative channels adequately reflect young people’s voices and needs.
The Commission therefore distinguishes between rejecting disproportionate prohibitions and recognizing that specific functionalities or services may be restricted where their risks are established and less restrictive measures are insufficient. The alternative to a blanket ban is not an unregulated market; it is to shift the focus of regulation from the child’s conduct to the platform’s duties and accountability for its business model.
2. The Surveillance-Based Business Model
Major platforms operate within an economic model that converts users’ attention and behavioral data into commercial value. Amnesty International’s 2019 report, “Surveillance Giants: How the Business Model of Google and Facebook Threatens Human Rights”, described this system as being based on the extensive and systematic collection of data, its analysis to predict and influence behavior, and its subsequent use for targeted advertising.
This model creates an incentive to prolong the time users spend on a service, increase the number of their interactions, and collect additional information about their interests, relationships, locations, and habits. For children, the problem is not limited to seeing an inappropriate advertisement. It also involves the creation of behavioral profiles at a developmental stage when children may not yet have the capacity to understand tracking or resist commercial influence, as well as the possibility of inferring sensitive information about their mental state, health, or personal concerns.
Tracking may occur both within a platform and across other websites and applications through cookies, device identifiers, and software development kits. As the volume of data increases, so does a company’s capacity to personalize content and advertising, creating a continuous incentive to expand data collection. Formal consent or lengthy terms of service are therefore insufficient. Behavioral advertising targeting children, commercial profiling, and the sale or sharing of children’s data for such purposes should be prohibited.
3. Algorithmic Recommendations and the Amplification of Harm
Recommendation systems determine what users see, in what order, and what is subsequently suggested to them. They analyze viewing time, likes, shares, follows, and other signals to predict the content most likely to attract attention. Although these systems may help users discover beneficial content, they may also prioritize material that provokes anger, fear, or controversy because it generates higher levels of engagement.
Risks are compounded when a child interacts once with content relating to self-harm, unrealistic body standards, dangerous challenges, misinformation, or extremist ideas, after which the algorithm continues to display similar material and draws the child into an increasingly intense content “rabbit hole.” The resulting harm is not merely the act of an individual publisher; it is also the consequence of a design decision determining the algorithm’s objective and indicators of success.
The law should therefore not be limited to removing content after harm has occurred. Platforms should be required to assess the effects of their recommendation systems on children’s rights, offer chronological or non-profiled alternatives, prevent the recommendation of sensitive content to children, and provide researchers and regulatory authorities with sufficient data to assess amplification, while protecting privacy and legitimate trade secrets.
4. Interface Design and the Capture of Attention
Many platforms use features such as infinite scrolling, autoplay, repeated notifications, like counts, usage streaks, and variable rewards. These are not always neutral aesthetic features; they may be designed to reduce natural stopping points, make disengagement more difficult, and reinforce the urge to check a service repeatedly.
Children and adolescents are more susceptible to signals of social acceptance and reward and may feel pressure to remain connected for fear of missing interactions or being excluded from a group. This can affect sleep, concentration, academic performance, and mental health. “Dark patterns” may also induce children to accept less-private settings, disclose additional data, or make purchases they did not intend to make.
Rules on age-appropriate design should therefore be introduced. These should include disabling autoplay and infinite scrolling or providing a clear means of turning them off; suspending notifications at night; providing reminders and breaks; prohibiting incentives that exploit children’s vulnerabilities; and testing interfaces with children and independent experts before deployment. These obligations address harm at its source instead of placing sole responsibility for managing screen time on families.
5. Misinformation and Harmful Narratives
Systems designed to maximize engagement may accelerate the spread of inaccurate health advice, conspiracy theories, stereotypes, and distorted representations of social issues. Children may lack the experience necessary to verify sources, distinguish advertising from other content, or understand why particular material has been presented to them.
These problems should not be addressed through general censorship of opinions or by preventing children from accessing news. A more rights-compliant approach would increase the transparency of recommendation and advertising systems, clearly identify sponsored content, provide tools for verifying sources, develop media and digital literacy, and adopt specific measures addressing unlawful content or incitement to imminent harm, based on clear standards and appeal procedures.
6. Digital Literacy and the Empowerment of Children and Families
Sustainable protection cannot be built solely on technical restrictions, because children will continue to use digital technologies in education, employment, and relationships even as the names of platforms change. The national framework should therefore include digital and media literacy programs beginning in schools and extending to parents, educators, and child-protection professionals.
These programs should cover privacy, tracking, and advertising; password and account management; recognizing grooming, extortion, and bullying; verifying information; reporting harm; and developing healthy habits relating to screen time and sleep. Materials should be age-appropriate, accessible to persons with disabilities, available in Arabic, and suitable for communities affected by the digital divide.
Education does not relieve platforms of responsibility. “Awareness-raising” must not become a justification for blaming children who have been subjected to exploitation. It does, however, complement structural regulation and give children the tools needed to develop progressive autonomy. The Commission therefore recommends incorporating digital empowerment into the substance of public policy, supported by indicators, a dedicated budget, and periodic evaluation, rather than leaving it as a general statement in the explanatory memorandum.
7. Regulatory Conclusion
The Commission concludes from this background that the source of risk is not simply a child’s presence online, but the intersection of age-related vulnerability with designs and business models that profit from attention and data. The response should therefore focus on duties of care, child-rights impact assessments, algorithmic transparency, the prohibition of behavioral advertising, safety-by-design, independent oversight, and digital literacy. Age-based restrictions should be used only as a specific and proportionate instrument within this broader framework.
V. Applicable Constitutional and International Framework
The Preamble to the Lebanese Constitution declares Lebanon a founding and active member of the United Nations, committed to its covenants and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and requires the State to embody these principles in all fields and areas without exception. Article 13 guarantees freedom of expression, whether spoken or written, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association within the limits established by law. These freedoms are not limited to adults, and the digital environment has become one of the principal means through which they are exercised and through which individuals access public debate, education, culture, and services.
The Constitution also enshrines personal liberty and equality, while the protection of private life, personal data, and correspondence is further grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, particularly Articles 17 and 19 of the Covenant. Under Article 19, freedom of expression may be restricted only pursuant to a clear legal provision, in pursuit of a legitimate objective, and where the restriction is necessary and proportionate. It is not sufficient for a measure to be useful or desirable; it must be shown to constitute the least intrusive means among the effective options available, and the harm it causes to the right must not outweigh the benefit achieved.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child, by which Lebanon is bound, requires the best interests of the child to be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children. It does not, however, render the principle an abstract formula capable of justifying any restriction. Its application requires a structured impact assessment and consideration of the child’s rights as a whole. Article 5 respects the responsibilities of parents to provide appropriate direction and guidance consistent with the child’s evolving capacities; Article 12 guarantees the right of a child capable of forming views to express them and to have those views given due weight; Articles 13 and 15 protect freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly; Article 16 protects privacy; Article 17 recognizes the importance of the media and children’s access to beneficial information while calling for appropriate guidelines to protect them from harmful material; and Article 19 requires protection from violence and abuse. The rights to health, education, play, and protection from sexual exploitation are also directly relevant.
General Comment No. 25 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, concerning children’s rights in relation to the digital environment, affirms that children’s rights apply without discrimination in the digital sphere and that States must protect children from harm while ensuring their effective access to digital technologies. It also calls for consideration of children’s evolving capacities, consultation with children when developing policies, high levels of privacy and safety by default, and the avoidance of age-verification methods that result in excessive data collection or disproportionate exclusion from services.
1. The Best Interests of the Child Are Not Synonymous With Prohibition
Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child requires the best interests of the child to be a primary consideration. This means that the legislature must identify the interests affected, balance them, and document that balancing exercise. The child’s best interests cannot be reduced solely to the prevention of harm; they also encompass the rights to development and progressive autonomy, family and social relationships, education, information, play, culture, and participation. Preventing a child from accessing a high-risk service may serve that child’s best interests, whereas denying an adolescent access to a helpline, support community, or educational resource may run contrary to them.
The required assessment must therefore not treat “children” as a single, homogeneous group. It must take account of age, maturity, disability, family and social circumstances, sex, language, and geographical location. It must also consider the effects of the measure on children who are particularly vulnerable, including refugee and stateless children, children with disabilities, children living apart from their families, victims of violence, and children facing discrimination because of their identity or status.
2. Freedom of Expression and Access to Information
Freedom of expression is not limited to expressing political opinions. It encompasses seeking, receiving, and imparting information and ideas, as well as research, learning, creativity, and social communication. Digital platforms have become an effective means of exercising these rights, even when operated by private companies. Denying access to them is therefore not a neutral technical measure, but a restriction of a fundamental right that must be prescribed by clear law and must be necessary and proportionate.
This does not imply an absolute right to use every platform or functionality. The State may restrict livestreaming, messages from strangers, or the display of particular content to young children. It may also require age assurance for access to a high-risk service. Restrictions should, however, specifically target the source of the risk rather than indiscriminately preventing safe reading and viewing, family communication, and access to services serving the public interest.
3. Privacy and the Protection of Digital Identity
Age verification is not a simple administrative step. It may transform the internet into a space in which every person must identify themselves before speaking or reading, thereby undermining the use of pseudonyms that protect victims of violence, whistleblowers, and human rights defenders. It may also create centralized databases containing identity documents or biometric images that are attractive targets for hacking, commercial exploitation, or surveillance.
The Commission therefore distinguishes between identity verification and age assurance. The former reveals who a person is, whereas the latter establishes only that the person is above a specified threshold. The default approach should be to assure age using the minimum amount of data, with technical and legal separation between the assurance provider and the platform, and without disclosing the individual’s name, an image of their identity document, or their full date of birth. The more intrusive the technology, the stricter the requirements for scrutiny, independence, and transparency must be.
4. Non-Discrimination and the Digital Divide
Facial- or voice-based age-estimation systems may produce higher error rates for persons with certain skin tones, sexes, or disabilities. Persons without identity documents, modern smartphones, or access to a means of payment may be unable to complete the verification process. Families with lower levels of digital literacy may also be less able to manage consent or submit objections. The discriminatory effects of any system must therefore be assessed before its adoption, accessible and free alternatives must be provided, and official identity documents must not be made the sole means of verification.
The law must likewise avoid widening the divide between children attending schools capable of providing secure, closed platforms and children who depend on free public services. A protective system that ultimately deprives the poorest children of access to information, while children from wealthier households remain able to use paid alternatives, does not achieve equality.
5. The Role and Limits of the Family
The Convention on the Rights of the Child respects parents’ responsibilities to provide guidance, but links those responsibilities to the child’s evolving capacities. The family’s role therefore gradually shifts from direct decision-making to guidance and support. Parental consent should not be understood as a waiver of the child’s right to privacy or as authorization for a platform to collect additional data. Nor may it be assumed that every family constitutes a safe environment or that every child can seek the consent of a parent or guardian, particularly in cases involving violence, family conflict, or missing documentation.
The law should provide parents with simplified information, require specific and revocable consent for medium-risk functionalities, and establish supervisory tools that do not unnecessarily disclose the contents of private communications. Certain high-risk functionalities may be prohibited for specific age groups even with parental consent. Conversely, access to confidential assistance, protection, and health services should not be subject to consent requirements that could place the child at risk.
Under Lebanese law, Law No. 81/2018 on Electronic Transactions and Personal Data provides an essential legal framework. It does not, however, relieve the legislature of the obligation to establish specific and enhanced safeguards for children and age-verification technologies. The proposed technologies may process facial images, identity documents, family data, or behavioral indicators and may produce errors or discriminatory outcomes. Essential elements affecting rights and safeguards must therefore not be deferred to subsequent implementing decisions.
VI. Significance of the French Constitutional Council’s Decision
In Decision No. 2026-911 DC, the French Constitutional Council ruled that Article 1 of the Law on Protecting Minors from the Risks of Social Networks was unconstitutional. While recognizing the differences between the two constitutional systems, the decision provides an important comparative reference because it illustrates the approach required when balancing child protection against digital freedoms.
Relying on Article 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the Council held that, given the importance of online public communication services, freedom of communication includes the freedom to access and express oneself through such services. It recognized that protecting the best interests of the child and preventing disturbances to public order are legitimate objectives that may justify restricting minors’ access. It nevertheless emphasized that such restrictions must be necessary, appropriate, and proportionate.
The Council found that the French prohibition covered every platform enabling communication, interaction, content sharing, or the discovery of users and content, without reference to particular functionalities, content, risks, or the inadequacy of protective measures. It also found that the limited educational and scientific exemptions did not cover collaborative information, entertainment, and assistance services; communication applications and games with social features; or networks connected with educational activities without being inherently educational. The prohibition could therefore apply to services that had not been shown to pose risks to minors’ health and safety.
The Council further observed that the prohibition applied to everyone under the age of fifteen without establishing a mechanism allowing persons with parental authority, after being informed of the risks and safeguards, to lift or limit the prohibition or authorize particular services in the child’s best interests. Nor did it permit an individualized assessment taking account of age, maturity, family circumstances, and the nature of the service. The Council concluded that broadly denying access to a wide range of communication services was unnecessary and disproportionate.
Regarding privacy, the Council explained that preventing persons under fifteen from gaining access would, in practice, require every user—including adults—to prove their age. Because the law did not define the conditions, limits, and safeguards governing that proof, the Council found that it failed to provide the legal protection required for private life. The decision therefore does not mean that age thresholds or age verification are inherently unconstitutional. Rather, the defects lay in the general nature of the prohibition and the inadequacy of its safeguards. This conclusion is directly relevant to the Lebanese proposal, which similarly relies on a broad definition, an absolute prohibition, and limited safeguards.
VII. Independent Assessment of the Proposal of 15 December 2025
1. Summary of the Commission’s Position on the First Proposal
The Commission appreciates the proposal’s clear attribution of primary responsibility to platforms, its recognition of the role of families and guardians, and its attempt to impose a financially deterrent penalty on major companies. It nevertheless considers that, in its concise form, the proposal does not establish a legislative framework capable of being implemented safely and consistently with human rights. It conflates “use,” “access,” and “account ownership”; establishes a general prohibition without defining social networks or video-sharing services; names specific companies rather than setting out a general standard; requires the presentation of identity documents without safeguards for data protection; and leaves most essential matters to implementing decrees. The Commission therefore recommends against adopting it in its current form.
2. General Prohibition up to the Age of Sixteen
Article 1 prohibits anyone under the age of sixteen from “using” social networks unless authorized by their parents or guardians, under their supervision and for a specified period. The term “use” is broader than the creation of an account. It may encompass viewing a publicly available link, watching a broadcast containing health information, reading news, participating in a virtual class, or communicating during an emergency. The proposal does not specify whether the prohibition covers browsing without an account, an account managed by a school or association, or a private messaging service.
The proposal also treats all persons under sixteen and all services alike, without distinguishing according to maturity, the type of content or functionality, or the degree of risk. Although parental authorization limits the absolute nature of the prohibition, the requirements of “supervision” and a “specified period” remain undefined: Who grants authorization? How is it demonstrated? What is its maximum duration? Does supervision mean accessing private messages? How would the law address a child who does not live with their parents or needs confidential protection services? Leaving these questions unanswered threatens legal clarity, privacy, and equality.
3. Specific Prohibition on Video-Sharing Services
Article 2 establishes a separate prohibition on accessing video-sharing services, but neither defines those services nor clarifies their relationship with the prohibition in Article 1. Most social networks include video-sharing functions, while educational and media platforms and institutional websites also publish beneficial video content. The provision may therefore prohibit educational, cultural, and health-related content or create an unclear duplication of legal rules.
Instead of prohibiting video as a medium in itself, the law should regulate the associated risks: automated recommendations that amplify harmful content; autoplay; livestreaming; comments and messages from strangers; profiling and advertising; and age-inappropriate content. The risk arises from design and context, not solely from the audiovisual format.
4. Naming Specific Platforms
Article 3 names X, TikTok, YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram. This formulation raises concerns regarding equality and technological neutrality. It excludes other comparable services, becomes obsolete when a new platform emerges or an existing platform changes its name or ownership, and may be understood as legislation directed at particular companies. The law should instead establish a precise, general, and functional definition applicable to every service that meets objective criteria, while allowing services to be classified according to risk through transparent regulatory decisions subject to appeal.
5. Verification Through Identity Documents
The proposal requires platforms to verify age through the presentation of an identity card or equivalent document “to disclose personal details.” This is its most serious provision from a privacy perspective. In practice, its implementation would require every user, whether an adult or a child, to disclose their identity or an official document to a private platform, potentially transferring an image of that document outside Lebanon. The text does not specify what data may be collected, the exclusive purpose for which it may be used, the retention period, storage-security requirements, prohibitions on sale, profiling, or algorithmic training, liability for data breaches, or rights of access, erasure, and objection.
This requirement could also exclude children and adults who do not possess valid documents, including refugees, stateless persons, and members of marginalized groups, and could endanger users of pseudonyms, activists, and victims. The expression “to disclose personal details” is incompatible with the principle of data minimization. Technically, only proof that the user exceeds a specified age threshold is required, without revealing their identity or full date of birth. The requirement to present an identity document directly to the platform should therefore be removed and replaced with an independent, privacy-preserving age-assurance system that provides equitable alternatives and human review.
6. The Fine of up to USD 50 Million
The substantial amount is intended to create a deterrent effect, but the proposal does not establish a minimum fine, clear criteria for calculating it, or a graduated system taking account of the seriousness of the violation, the number of children affected, the extent of the harm, the duration and recurrence of the violation, the platform’s level of cooperation, and the scale of its operations and revenues. It also fails to identify the authority competent to impose the fine; procedures for investigation, evidence, defence, and appeal; or whether the fine applies to each individual violation or to the violations collectively. Moreover, a general reference to “relevant international laws” does not, in itself, establish judicial or administrative jurisdiction or provide a practical mechanism for enforcing the penalty.
In this context, there are genuine difficulties in imposing and enforcing fines of this magnitude against global social media companies, such as Meta and others, particularly where those companies have no registered office, authorized representative, or assets liable to seizure in Lebanon. The effectiveness of a fine does not depend on its nominal value alone. It depends on the State’s ability to identify the legally responsible entity, serve it with notice, investigate it, obtain the necessary data and evidence, issue an enforceable decision, and ultimately collect the fine, including through cross-border judicial and regulatory cooperation.
These difficulties are compounded in a country such as Lebanon, where the internet-governance framework remains fragmented and the State lacks an integrated and independent regulatory authority with the powers, resources, and technical expertise required to hold major digital platforms accountable. Lebanon also faces weaknesses in institutional oversight and digital infrastructure, as well as insufficient modernization of legislation governing telecommunications, the internet, data protection, artificial intelligence, and algorithmic systems. Furthermore, there is no comprehensive and binding framework governing corporate social responsibility and human rights, particularly with respect to transnational digital companies, that defines obligations relating to due diligence, disclosure, transparency, cooperation with national authorities, and access to remedy.
Against this background of legislative and institutional weakness, a substantial fine may remain a symbolic provision that is difficult to enforce. Alternatively, the threat of such a fine may lead authorities to resort directly to blocking the platform, with broad and disproportionate effects on freedom of expression, access to information, and the digital economy. Global companies may also be able to challenge the fine on the grounds of unclear jurisdiction, procedures, or legal basis, while local and smaller operators may be affected more severely, undermining proportionality and equality in the application of the law.
For penalties to be lawful and foreseeable, the law must precisely define the violation; the natural or legal person responsible; the authority competent to investigate and impose the penalty; the rules governing territorial jurisdiction; the procedures for notification, evidence, defence, and appeal; and the mechanisms for recognizing and enforcing decisions. Platforms offering services to users in Lebanon should also be required to appoint a local legal representative authorized to receive official notices, cooperate with the regulatory authority, and implement its decisions. Mechanisms for international cooperation, information-sharing, and mutual legal assistance should also be established.
Graduated administrative fines could be calculated as a percentage of the annual worldwide turnover of major platforms, subject to clear ceilings and criteria, with fixed and proportionate amounts applying to smaller operators. These may be supplemented by binding corrective orders and periodic penalties for delays in compliance. More severe measures, such as restricting a particular functionality or suspending a service, should be preceded by warnings, compliance plans, and genuine opportunities to remedy violations. Decisions imposing serious measures should be subject to effective judicial review. Reliance on a single nominal fine, regardless of its amount, without building a national system for internet governance, oversight, corporate accountability, and cross-border cooperation, cannot guarantee deterrence, proportionality, or effective enforcement.
7. Delegation to Implementing Decrees and Immediate Entry into Force
The proposal delegates the “details of implementation” to decrees adopted upon the proposal of the Ministers of Telecommunications, Education, and Finance. It does not, however, designate an authority responsible for overseeing data protection and children’s rights, nor does it establish a role for the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, or an independent body. More importantly, definitions, the verification model, safeguards, procedures, exemptions, and avenues of redress are not merely technical details; they are essential elements that must be determined by the law itself.
The law’s immediate entry into force upon publication is also incompatible, in practical terms, with the need to issue implementing decrees, develop and test verification systems, and raise awareness among families and platforms. It could prompt platforms to suspend services or collect identity documents hastily and without adequate protection. The law should therefore establish a transitional period of at least nine to twelve months after the implementing regulations are issued, along with phased implementation, impact assessments, and public consultations.
8. Recommendation Regarding the First Proposal
The Commission recommends that the proposal not be adopted unless it is amended to: define its scope in functional terms; replace the prohibition on “use” with graduated restrictions on particular services and functionalities; establish rules governing parental consent and the limits of supervision; remove references to specific companies; replace identity disclosure with privacy-preserving age assurance; incorporate explicit data-protection rules; designate an independent regulatory authority and establish complaint and appeal procedures; regulate the imposition of fines; and provide exemptions for education, information, assistance, and essential communications.
Without these amendments, the proposal is more likely to result in extensive identity-data collection and digital exclusion than to provide effective protection.
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